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Abstract
In this paper we consider certain key establishment protocols specied in an inter-
national standard and a draft international standard. These protocols are all intended
to provide joint key control, i.e. the protocols are designed to prevent either party
choosing the key value. We show that this claim is suspect for most of the protocols
concerned.
Index Terms: key agreement, key distribution, authentication protocol
1 Introduction
As dened in ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3, [1], key agreement is the process of establishing a
shared secret key between two entities A and B in such a way that neither of them can
predetermine the value of the key. DIS 11770-3 species seven key agreement protocols.
In addition, two protocols in ISO/IEC 11770-2, [2], are apparently designed to provide
joint key control; they certainly enable both parties to inuence the value of the key.
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There are a number of practical circumstances in which it may be useful to use a key
agreement protocol. For example, neither party may trust the other to choose a suitable
key, and use of a key agreement protocol enables them to choose a mutually acceptable
shared key. Moreover it is often recommended to use key agreement to prevent one party
having any kind of advantage over the other.
2 The basic mechanism
In both the mechanisms in ISO/IEC 11770{2 (Key Establishment Mechanisms 5 and 6),
and in six out of the seven key agreement mechanisms in ISO/IEC DIS 11770{3, i.e.
all but Key Agreement Mechanism 1, the method for agreeing the key between the two
parties operates in much the same way. Both parties choose a secret `key component',
and these secret components, or a function of them, are exchanged. The shared secret
key is then computed as a one-way function of the two key components. In principle this
provides key agreement since neither party has any means of controlling the nal value
of the key.
3 A practical limitation
In practice, one party, say B, will receive the key component (or a function of it) of the
other party, say A, before B sends its component back to A. This will put B at an unfair
advantage. In particular, if B is prepared to perform approximately 2
s
computations of
the one-way function used to combine key components prior to sending a response to A,
then B will be able to choose s bits of the shared secret key. To do this B rst nominates
s bit positions in the shared key and chooses values for these s bits. B now generates a
series of random values for its key component, and combines each with the key component
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information supplied by A. As soon as an output key which has the s nominated bits equal
to the chosen values is found, then the corresponding key component value is selected.
After 2
s
such random selections, the chances are that an appropriate value will have been
found.
Of course the need for B to perform 2
s
computations prior to returning a response to
A, will typically severely limit the value of s. This holds since A will often only accept
a response if it arrives within a short space of time (e.g. a second). However, if a hash-
function such as SHA{1 is used to combine the keys, then given the availability of high-
speed implementations of such functions, it may be possible to test as many as 10
4
  10
5
key components in a second or so, allowing as many as 16 bits of the shared key to be
chosen by B. In situations where a reply is not expected so quickly, larger values of s will
be possible.
4 Some specic examples
We now consider two examples of how this general point relates to specic key agreement
mechanisms from [1, 2]. A slightly simplied version of Key Establishment Mechanism 5
from [2] involves the following exchange of messages between A and B:
M
1
: A! B: e
K
AB
(T
A
jjID
B
jjF
A
)
M
2
: B ! A: e
K
AB
(T
B
jjID
A
jjF
B
)
where e
K
AB
(X) denotes the encryption of data X using the secret key K
AB
(shared by
A and B), X jjY denotes the concatenation of data items X and Y , T
A
and T
B
are
timestamps, ID
A
and ID
B
are identiers for entities A and B respectively, and F
A
and
F
B
are key components chosen by A and B respectively. At the conclusion of the protocol
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A and B calculate the shared secret key asK = w(F
A
jjF
B
) where w is a one-way function.
Using the argument from the previous section it should be clear that B has an advantage
over A in this mechanism, as long as B waits to receive M
1
before sending M
2
.
A second example is provided by an implementation of Key Agreement Mechanism 5 from
[1] (this is the Matsumoto-Takashima-Imai A(0) protocol). This involves the following
exchange of messages between A and B:
M
1
: A! B: g
r
A
mod p
M
2
: B ! A: g
r
B
mod p
where r
A
and r
B
are random key component values chosen by A and B respectively, g is
a primitive element mod p, and p is a `safe' prime (where g, p are globally agreed).
To use this protocol A and B must have private/public key pairs (h
A
,p
A
), (h
B
,p
B
) re-
spectively, where p
A
= g
h
A
mod p and p
B
= g
h
B
mod p, and A and B must have trusted
copies of each others' public keys. At the conclusion of the protocol A calculates the
shared secret key as
K = w(p
r
A
B
jj(g
r
B
)
h
A
)
(working mod p), where w is a one-way function. B calculates the same key as
K = w((g
r
A
)
h
B
jjp
r
B
A
):
It should again be clear that B has an advantage over A (as long as B waits to receive
M
1
before sending M
2
).
5 Providing genuine key agreement
To remove the problem identied above we need to ensure that both parties choose their
own key components before seeing the other party's component. This could be (partially)
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achieved by requiring the recipient of one component to respond with its component in a
very short space of time. Alternatively, a Trusted Third Party could act as a mediator,
and require both components to be supplied to it before passing them on.
Clearly both these approaches have shortcomings. A more practical approach involves one
party (B say) generating their component, and also calculating a hashed version of this
component using a one-way hash function h. This hash-code, which we call a commitment,
is passed to the other party (A). A now generates its component and passes it to B. B
now passes its component back to A, who checks that it matches the previously provided
commitment. Observe that, as long as h is one-way and components contain suciently
many bits, A cannot misuse B's commitment to help choose its component. Moreover, B
is forced to choose its component before seeing A's component.
6 Conclusions
It has been shown that certain key agreement protocols, either standardised or approach-
ing standardisation, are not strictly `fair', in that one party can exert some control over
the mutually agreed key. A general approach to avoiding this problem through the use
of commitments, a well-established concept in the study of cryptographic protocols, has
been described.
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